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1Introduction
In 1996, Congress passed the bipartisan Federal Tea Tasters Repeal Act,1 repealing the Tea Importation
Act,2 a relatively obscure 99 year-old piece of legislation. Passed in 1897, the Tea Act prohibited importation
of tea into the United States that failed to meet government standards for quality, purity, and tness for
consumption.3
At the time of the repeal, the Food and Drug Administration enforced the Tea Act, pursuant to a delegation
of authority from the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The entire regulatory program cost taxpayers
less than $200,000 per year;4 although the inspection program was ambitious, it was supported largely by
industry in the form of user fees.5
The Tea Act authorized the FDA to appoint a Board of Tea Experts, whose job it was to set federal standards
of quality, purity, and tness for consumption.6 The FDA was also responsible for inspecting each and every
lot of tea entering the country,7 and for providing administrative adjudication by an appointed Board of
Tea Appeals.8 Although the Federal Tea Tasters Repeal Act of 1996 ended this regulatory program, FDA
retains the power to regulate the safety and purity of tea under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
of 1938.9
The goal of this paper is to provide a general history of the Tea Importation Act of 1897. It focuses on the
1P.L. 104-128, 110 Stat. 1198 (April 9, 1996).
229 Stat. 604 (March 2, 1897) codied at 21 U.S.C. x 41, et seq., repealed by 110 Stat. 1198 (April 9, 1996). This is the
Act's ocial short title, as provided for by 57 Stat. 499 (July 12, 1943). However, the Act has been known by many other
names, including the Impure Tea Act, the Impure Tea Importation Act, the Tea Act, and the Tea Inspection Act.
3Tea Importation Act x 1, 21 U.S.C. x 41 (1996).
4The precise gure is debated, but no estimate exceeds $200,000, the total cost of the program.
5Tea Importation Act x 13, 21 U.S.C. x 46(a) (1996).
6Tea Importation Act xx 2-3, 21 U.S.C. x 42-43 (1996).
7Tea Importation Act x 4, 21 U.S.C. x 44 (1996).
8Tea Importation Act x 6, 21 U.S.C. x 46 (1996).
921 U.S.C. xx 301 et seq.
2Act's legislative scheme, the Act's antecedents and amendments, and its legislative history. Special attention
is paid to a twenty-year period of litigation early in the Act's history, from 1898 to 1918, challenging the Act
and its enforcement under the Constitution. However, enforcement practices of the various agencies charged
with the Act's administration are not addressed by the paper, except when signicant to litigation or the
legislative process.
A Few Interesting Notes about Tea
According to legend, tea was discovered quite by accident in 2737 B.C. by Shen Nung, the Emperor of
China.10 With such illustrious beginnings, it is no surprise that tea has a special place in history. As the
legend goes, the Emperor had a practice of drinking boiled water, because he believed that the beverage
promoted good health. One day, the Emperor was sitting outside, boiling his drinking water over an open
re. By chance, a few leaves from a nearby camellia sinesis fell into the hot water, and steeped, producing
the world's rst serving of tea. The Emperor tried the resulting brew, and declared that it produced vigor
of body, contentment of mind, and determination of purpose.11 Today, tea remains one of the most popular
beverages in the world, second only to water.12
However, Americans too have made their mark on tea history. Although the popularity of tea in the coee-
10See Marian Segal, Tea: A Story of Serendipity, (last modied May 6, 1998; visited April 14, 2000)
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/296 tea.html. Segal is a member of the FDA's public relations sta. Id. The New
York City-based Tea Council of the U.S.A provided most of Segal's statistics and historical information. Id.
11Id.
12Id.
3drinking United States has decreased over the last century, contemporary Americans continue to consume
vast quantities of the beverage.13 Though Americans drink their fair share of tea, however, their methods of
doing so are \unique" among the world's nations in that fully four-fths of all tea consumed by Americans
is iced.14
While credit for the discovery of tea may legitimately go to Emperor Shen Nung, iced tea is a thoroughly
American variation, invented in 1904 at the Louisiana State Purchase Exposition in St. Louis, Missouri.
The weather at the Exposition was hot enough that one beverage stand, the Far East Tea House, serving
hot tea, was unable to lure any customers. In a desperate attempt to salvage the day, the sta of the Far
East Tea House started pouring the unwanted tea over ice. This \iced tea" quickly became the beverage of
choice at the Exposition.15 Today, canned and bottled iced tea is one of the fastest growing products on
supermarket shelves.16
The innovation of the tea bag is also properly credited to American capitalism. In the same year that iced
tea made its debut, a Boston retailer hit upon a method of providing small samples of his teas to prospective
customers. He sent out single servings of various teas in small silk pouches, and the tea bag was born.
Because tea bags were conveniently pre-measured and easy to dispose of, they eventually came to dominate
the market, although in a more economical paper incarnation.17 Today in America, nearly all freshly brewed
tea is prepared from tea bags.18
13Id. In 1994, American drank 2.25 billion gallons of tea. Id.
14Id.
15Id.
16Id.
17Id.
18Id. In 1994, 60% of all tea consumed in America came from tea bags, while only 1% was brewed from loose leaves. The
remainder was prepared using instant and iced-tea mixes, indicating the importance of convenience to the American tea market.
Id.
4Historically, most tea imported into the United States came from China and Japan.19 However, during
World War II, the emphasis switched to India and Ceylon, as commercial relations with China and Japan
were curtailed.20 Today, the majority of tea entering the nation originates in Argentina, China, and Java.21
Also note that signicant quantities of tea are produced domestically, in the Southern states of the Union.
Tea comes in three basic varieties: Green, Oolong, and Black.22 Currently, the most popular in the United
States is black, although that was not always the case.23 All three types are prepared from the same
plant; only the method of preparation diers. The greatest dierence between the three methods lies in the
varying amount of fermentation: Tea leaves used to make black tea are withered, rolled in special machines
to partially release their natural juices, left to ferment in a climate-controlled environment, and then oven
dried. Oolong tea goes through the same processes as black tea, except that the fermentation process is
substantially shorter. Leaves used to make green tea are not fermented at all. In fact, they are heated
immediately after picking in order to prevent fermentation; then they are rolled and dried.24
Other terms familiar to the reader, such as Orange Pekoe, describe the size25 and age26 of the leaves. Strictly
19Id.
20Id.
21Id. During the Korean War, uncertainties about reliable tea supplies resurfaced. Argentina became an important source,
as Argentina was geographically and politically removed from the conict and tea could be grown very quickly in the South
American climate. Although Argentina produces teas of only average quality, they are especially suited to being served iced,
which partially accounts for the continuing popularity of Argentinean tea in United States markets. Id.
22Id.
23Id. Notably, it is suggested that World War II accounts for the prevalent use of black tea in the United States. Prior to
the War, only 40% of tea consumed by Americans was black. Another 40% was green, and the remaining 20% was oolong.
However, China and Japan are the major producers of green and oolong tea, and these sources were shut o during the war.
However, trade routes to India, which produces primarily black tea, remained open. Due to relative availability, and possibly
due in part to anti-Asian sentiments on the part of tea drinkers in the United States, by the end of the War, nearly 99% of tea
consumed in America was black. Although green and oolong teas have regained some of their former popularity, this pattern
of consumption remains largely intact. Id.
24Id.
25Id. In terms of size, larger leaves are referred to as orange pekoe, pekoe, and pekoe souchong. Smaller and broken leaves
(from largest to smallest) are called broken orange pekoe, broken pekoe souchong, broken orange pekoe fannings, and nes.
Fines are also referred to as \tea dust." Id.
26Similar terms are used to describe the age of the leaf. From youngest to oldest, the terms used are owery pekoe, orange
pekoe, pekoe, souchong 1st, souchong 2nd, Congou, and Bohea. Many teas utilize leaves of dierent ages, and common
combinations have their own names, derived from the terms referring to age, e.g., tea made from souchong and younger leaves is
called Pekoe Souchong. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Division of Chemistry, Bulletin No. 13, Foods and Food Adulterants,
Part VII { Tea, Coee, and Cocoa Preparations 876 (1892).
5speaking, most of these qualitative terms should be applied only to black tea.27 However, it is not unheard
of for the terms to be used to describe oolong teas.28
Early Tea Regulation in England
In contrast to the later American Tea Importation Act, early British legislation was not aimed primarily
at prohibiting the importation of impure tea. Rather, the rst British laws proscribed the very act of
adulteration. Probably due to enforcement diculties, subsequent laws targeted ancillary activity. Perhaps
the early British approach is explained by a perception that adulteration was more of a local problem than
an international one.29 It may also be partially attributed to the fact that the only importers of tea at the
time were Crown-chartered businesses.30
Although not easy for us to intuit today, historically, the English crown had a special interest in regulating
the purity of tea. This is not merely because the crown had an interest in the health of its subjects,
although health concerns certainly provided some motivation for prohibiting adulteration.31 It is likely that
the stronger motivation for government involvement came from a desire to protect tax revenues.32 Reliable
27Segal, supra, note 10. The terms \fannings" and \nes" are generally applicable. Id.
28Id.
29This view is to be contrasted with the late 19th century American perception that adulteration was primarily the fault
of the ultimate suppliers, the majority of whom at that time were Chinese wholesalers. There is some reason to believe that
America received tea of far lower quality than did England. However, this is not to suggest that signicant adulteration did
not occur once teas reached the American market. It is not inconceivable that the 19th century American view was colored by
prejudice against China and Chinese nationals.
30See F. Leslie Hart, Adulteration of Food Before 1906, 7 FDC L.J. 5, 12 (1952). These companies had government-sanctioned
monopolies. Id.
31See id.; see also 17 Geo. 3, c. 29., x 1 (1730), citing \the prejudice of the health of His Majesty's subjects" as a reason
for the legislation. Id. This and the following English statutes are as taken from Douglas C. Bartley, Adulteration of Food,
Statutes, Cases and Regulations, Fourth edition, 1-12, (1929).
32See Hart, supra note 30, at 12 (stating, \Increase in public revenue was of more importance than an increase in public
health."); see also 17 Geo. 3, c. 29., x 1 (1730) (citing \the diminution of the revenue," as another reason for the legislation).
6enforcement of tea taxes depended on regulating the purity of tea.
In England, tea was a perfect subject for taxation. First, although tea is relatively inexpensive in our
economy, at that time it was considered a luxury product.33 Excise taxes on luxury items assured that
government revenues came from those who had the funds to supply them.34 The crown received its revenues
out of the discretionary income of the upper classes, and the poor did not suer extreme tax burdens. Second,
tea could not be grown domestically. It had to be imported, necessarily passing through one of a limited
number of ports. Evasion of the tax was dicult, since it could be assessed at the point of entry.
Unfortunately, the tax scheme exacerbated the problem of adulterated tea in English markets.35 The practice
was already common, as the economic incentives were undeniable. Dishonest importers and merchants could
realize higher prots by adulterating tea and selling it at competitive prices. Tea was often adulterated at
its eastern source, but adulteration also occurred once the tea reached the local market.36 As tea was sold
to local merchants by weight, importers increased its density with the admixture of iron lings, clay, and
gypsum.37 In their turn, the local merchants further adulterated the tea by mixing in exhausted tea leaves38
and the leaves of foreign plants.39 There was a great demand for inexpensive tea, and consumers, unaware
of the fraud, were ready and willing to buy the \tea" at competitive prices. This adulteration was extremely
dicult to detect.
This pre-existing incentive to adulterate tea was further compounded by a desire to avoid paying the crown
Other purposes included preventing \the injury and destruction of great quantities of timber, woods, and underwoods,... the
ruin of the fair trader, and... the encouragement of idleness..." Id.
33Hart, supra note 30, at 12.
34Id. at 13. Although Hart is discussing taxes on coee at this point in his article, the principle remains the same.
35Id. at 17 (stating, \Tea, being subject to an excise tax, was particularly subject to adulteration.")
36Id. at 12, citing Ukers, All About Tea (1935).
37Id.
38Id. The previously used tea leaves could be purchased in quantity from hotels and coee-houses. Id. Exhausted leaves were
sometimes treated with the bitter extracts of elder and catechu (terra japonica) in order to impart avor. Id. They could also
be dyed with catechu, molasses, clay, logwood, and other ingredients in order to improve their color. See 4 Geo. 2, c. 14 x 11
(1730). This process was referred to as \sophisticating" tea. Id.
39Id. Commonly used foreign leaves included licorice, sloe, ash, and elder. See 17 Geo. 3, c. 29 x 1 (1776). These foreign
leaves were processed in the same way as exhausted leaves. Id.
7its cut.40 Tea was taxed as a luxury product, but the leaves commonly used to adulterate tea were not
subject to duties. Although selling a mixture of tea and other leaves may not technically been an illegal
tax evasion, adulterated tea was eectively taxed at a lower rate than pure tea. Since consumers generally
believed they were buying pure tea, the actual demand for tea on the English market was lower than it
would have been absent the adulteration. Obviously, the less tea imported into the nation, the lower the
revenue collected by the crown on through its tax scheme. Therefore, the English government therefore had
a signicant scal interest in maintaining the purity of tea sold in its markets.
The English government attempted to counter the practice by enacting laws prohibiting the adulterated tea.
In 1724, during the reign of George I, a law was passed which forbid mixing tea with any other substance.41
The penalties were forfeiture of the adulterated tea and a ne of one hundred pounds.42 However, this law
only dealt with the manufacture of adulterated product; it did not, for example, penalize selling impure
tea.43
George II strengthened the law a few years later in 1730.44 In addition to the previous prohibition, the new
law forbid dealers in tea to sell adulterated tea.45 A dealer's possession of adulterated tea or of non-tea
leaves commonly used to adulterate tea also subjected him to penalties under the law.46 For every pound of
adulterated or imitation tea, the dealer had to pay ten pounds.47 This fee structure guaranteed that those
convicted of the most egregious oenses paid the largest penalties.
Decades later, the English found that disturbing amounts of adulterated tea remained in their markets.
Although the prohibitions in the previous laws were fairly comprehensive, only tea dealers could be convicted
40Hart, supra note 30, at 17.
41Id. at 12; see also 11 Geo. 1, c. 30 (1724).
42See 11 Geo. 1, c. 30 (1724).
43Id.
44Hart, supra note 30, at 12; see also 4 Geo. 2, c. 14 (1730).
45See 4 Geo. 2, c. 14 x 11. In an eort to include as much undesirable activity as possible in the scope of the prohibition,
the Act forbid dealers in tea to \sell and vend, or utter, oer, or expose to sale" adulterated tea. Id.
46Id.
47Id.
8of the majority of oenses.48 This left a gaping whole in the enforcement scheme; anyone who wasn't a dealer
in tea was free to manufacture imitation tea and tea `stretchers' from non-tea leaves.49 They were also free
to sell it to tea dealers, who would subsequently mix the imitation leaves with actual tea, and sell the
mixture as pure.50 Apparently, the practice was so widespread that the gathering of huge quantities of
leaves endangered the health of English forests.51
In 1776,52 an additional law was passed to combat the problem.53 Non-dealers were now subject to the
same prohibitions as dealers.54 However, the penalty was lower; oenders were ned ve pounds for every
pound of adulterated or imitation tea, rather than the ten pounds ne to which dealers were subject.55 An
additional measure was aimed at the production of imitation tea: the Act provided penalties for possession
of more than six pounds of leaves of any kind if the possessor was unable to satisfactorily prove he had
permission to gather the leaves from the trees' owner.56
Federal Regulation of Tea in the United States
Though tea is not the contemporary beverage of choice, it was of the utmost importance to 19th century
American society. However, as in England, the importance of tea in American culture did nothing to protect
48The prohibition of adulteration was generally applicable under 11 Geo. 1, c. 30 (1724), but penalties under 4 Geo. 2, c.
14 (1730) only applied to dealers.
49See 17 Geo. 3, c. 29, x 1 (1776).
50Id. Though previous laws made this sale criminal, apparently the incentive and ease with which tea could be adulterated
overcame good citizenship.
51Id. (citing \the injury and destruction of great quantities of timber, woods, and underwoods," as a motivating factor in
the passage of the legislation).
52See Bartley, supra note 31, at vii; but see Hart, supra note 30, at 13 (referring to the Act as a 1777 law).
5317 Geo. 3, c. 29, x 1 (1776).
54Id.
55Id.
56Id. x 2.
9the public from the evils of the laissez-faire marketplace. In fact, the American market subjected consumers
to many of the same problems suered by English consumers.
As in England, adulteration of tea was commonplace and occurred in several forms. Tea leaves would be
mixed with the leaves of other plants and sold as pure tea.57 Previously used tea leaves would be sold as
new.58 Consumers expected that particular teas would be colored { or \faced" - to improve their aesthetic
appearance,59 but coloring was also used to disguise inferior quality and the presence of foreign leaves.60
Additionally, facing tea was a common method of increasing its weight and therefore its price.61 Though
many facing substances were relatively safe for human consumption, others were not.62
Therefore, purchasing tea was a gamble, for health reasons as well as economic ones. But impure tea was
not the only - nor the greatest - threat to the health and safety of the American consumer in the late 19th
century. So the question arises as to why regulation of imported tea became a congressional imperative in
1883, prior to extensive federal involvement in the regulation of food in general.63 However, it is not so
strange as it sounds to us that tea would be the rst subject of federal food regulation.64
First, it must be understood that the vast majority of tea consumed in the United States was imported.
While it is unclear what proportion of this adulteration occurred domestically, there is no question that
a great deal of the tea entering the country was unacceptable.65 Contemporary wisdom blamed foreign
5722 Stat. 451 x 1 (March 2, 1883), repealed by 29 Stat. 604 x 12 (March 2, 1897).
58Id.
59Thomas Taylor, Report of the Microscopist, First Report of the Secretary of Agriculture 194-5 (1889). Particularly, green
teas from Japan were expected to be color enhanced. Id. at 194. Demand for colored teas was a relatively recent phenomenon,
beginning in around 1870. Id.
60Id. at 195. Taylor notes that American tea dealers favored colored teas because, \in teas so colored coarse leaves may pass
undetected." Id. Additionally, Taylor partially attributes the decreased quality in Japanese green tea to cultural misunder-
standing. He asserts that the American demand for colored tea lead the Japanese, \who value tea for its fragrance and delicacy"
to \naturally conclude that the quality of the leaf which is subjected to such treatment [i.e., coloring] is not important." Id.
61See Macy v. Browne, 215 F. 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
62Taylor, supra note 59, at 195; see also U.S. Department of Agriculture, Division of Chemistry, Bulletin No. 13, supra note
26, at 886; see also H. Rep. No. 54-3029, at 1 (1897) (stating that imported teas were \injurious to health" and \deleterious").
63The rst general federal food legislation was the Food and Drugs Act, passed in 1906. Hutt and Merrill, Food and Drug
Law, Cases and Materials, Second Edition, 4 (1991).
64Id.; see also H.W. Schultz, Ph.D., Food Law Handbook 333 (1981).
65F. K. Killingsworth, Import Control, 2 FDC L.J. 498, 500 (1947).
10importers for the bulk of the problem. Reportedly, the most egregious of the oenders were Chinese whole-
salers, who purportedly viewed America as a dumping ground for the world's worst tea.66 However correct
or incorrect that perception, it can not be denied that vast quantities of imported tea was adulterated in one
fashion or another. Targeting adulterated tea as it crossed the border was considered an eective strategy
for improving the purity of tea as it reached the consumer.
Further, the power to regulate imports was squarely within Congress's Article I Section 8 plenary power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations. In contrast, for Congress to eectively regulate foods in general
would require exercise of the interstate commerce power. As most food consumed in the United States at
the time was not imported, but produced domestically, the foreign commerce power could have little eect
on the nation's food supply.
Even if Congress were to pass a law regarding the food safety pursuant to the interstate commerce power, a
large proportion of the market would remain unregulated, as the commerce power would not have reached
locally grown and processed foods. In the 1880's, the reach of the commerce power was limited. The national
economy was far less integrated that it is today, and the reach of the commerce power is largely dependent
on the economic interaction between states. As the economy became increasingly nationalized, Congress's
power under the commerce clause expanded. The contemporary commerce clause has few limits.
Under 19th century circumstances, states were the natural defenders of the food supply. However, most
states were in no position to regulate imports.67 Therefore, if regulation of imported tea was desirable, it
was only natural that the federal government should step into the breach. In addition to the constitutional
power to deal eectively with the problem, Congress also had practical experience with import legislation,
66Terence Samuel, To the Bitter End, Congress is eliminating government's ocial tea taster, The Dallas Morning News,
April 21, 1996, at 1A.
67But see Fraudulent Butter and Adulterated Tea, The Central Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 8, 142. Apparently in New York
(the port of entry for most imported tea at that time), distribution of adulterated tea could be enjoined as a nuisance, providing
the adulteration was severe. Id.
11having passed similar regulatory programs relating to imported medicines.68 Perhaps most signicantly,
the executive branch already has institutions in place with the capacity to carry out an ambitious inspec-
tion program: U.S. Customs under the Department of the Treasury was available to take on the task of
enforcement.
1883: Congress's First Attempt
In 1883, Congress passed \An act to prevent the importation of adulterated and spurious Teas."69 The Act
prohibited the importation of teas adulterated with foreign or exhausted leaves, as well as teas that were
unt for use due to the \admixture of chemicals or other deleterious substances."70 The Secretary of the
Treasury was given authority to promulgate appropriate regulations in order to enforce the prohibition.71
Upon arriving in the country, all shipments of tea were warehoused to await inspection.72 The importer
was to submit a sample of tea of every line item in his invoice to be examined along with a signed written
statement that the samples represented the true quality of the lot.73 If an examiner had reason to believe
the importer falsied his samples, the examiner had three days to examine the lots themselves.74 Importers
were required to give bond that the tea would not be removed from the warehouse unless and until it passed
an examination by customs ocials for purity and tness for consumption.75
At some ports, inspections were made by `duly qualied appraisers,' but at smaller ports a qualied appraiser
68Letter from the Treasury Department (January 15th 1883) as reprinted in H. Rep. No. 47-1927, at 1 (1883).
6922 Stat. 451 (March 2, 1883), repealed by 29 Stat. 604 x 12 (March 2, 1897).
70Id. x 1.
71Id. x 8. U.S. Customs was (and is) a branch of the Treasury department. At the time, no other federal agency was
competent to enforce the inspection program. As the Secretary of the Treasury had the ultimate responsibility for enforcement
of the 1883 Act, granting the Secretary rulemaking authority was not incongruous.
72Id. x 2.
73Id.
74Id.
75Id.
12might not be available.76 In these circumstances, the same ocials responsible for collecting duties examined
teas.77 Once the tea passed inspection, it would be immediately released from the control of the customs
authorities.78 In the event that an importer was unhappy with the result of the inspection, he could call for
a re-examination.79 Additionally, on the importer's request, disputes over examination results were referred
to arbitration to a committee of three experts.80 However, once a lot of tea was ultimately rejected, it had
to be re-exported within six months.81 If the importer instead abandoned his tea at the warehouse, customs
would destroy the tea after six months.82
A Congressional concern for consumer protection partially explains the passages of the Act.83 Britain had
recently passed a similar law, which contributed to the House Committee on Ways and Means' favorable
report.84 However, the strongest motivation appears to have been an appeal by the American tea industry for
federal protection from foreign tea interests.85 In fact, the 1883 Act was drafted by American importers and
dealers, who lobbied heavily for its passage.86 Further, Ways and Means consulted with industry associations
before recommending the bill's passage87 and expressed a desire to prevent any serious inconvenience to
76Id. x 5.
77Id.
78Id. x 2.
79Id. x 3.
80Id. x 4.
81Id.
82Id.
83H. Rep. No. 47-1927, at 1 (1883), stating, \The necessity of such legislation as will fully protect the consumers of teas in
this country against teas which have been deprived of their `proper quality, strength, or virtue, by steeping, infusion, decoction,
or other means' cannot be questioned...." Id.
84Id. In fact, some of the language utilized in the 1883 Act was borrowed from the British legislation, General Statutes of
Great Britain, 38 Victoria 583. Id.
85Killingsworth, supra note 65, at 502.
86Letter from the Importers and Grocers' Exchange of New York to A.P. Ketchum, Chief Appraiser of the New York Custom-
House (written between Jan. 30 and Feb. 13, 1884), as re-printed in H.R. Ex. Doc. 61, Part 2, 2 (1884). The letter states,
\The act approved March 2, 1883, was prepared by the importers and dealers in tea generally, and was urged upon Congress
by them for their own protection as well as for the protection of the consumer." Id.
87H. Rep. No. 47-1927, at 1 (1883) (stating, \The bill as reported has been examined by the executive committee of tea trade
of New York City and the Board of Trade of Philadelphia, and likewise by others engaged in the tea trade in other sections,
and meets with a unanimous indorsement [sic] as far as your committee is informed").
13American tea dealers.88
In the fullness of time, Congress's rst attempt to regulate tea imports was widely considered unsuccessful.
First, the Act failed to protect consumers from adulterated tea. Second, while it may have oered American
industry some protection from foreign interests, enforcement of the Act caused signicant injury to American
businesses. It became apparent that the regulatory scheme was fraught with opportunities for slipups and
for arbitrary enforcement.
Attempts to amend the 1883 Act fail
Within a year, it became clear that the regulatory scheme required legislative adjustment. In early 1884,
draft legislation was proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury.89 While the 1883 Act had \worked a great
public benet in the exclusion of worthless stu heretofore imported and sold as tea," amendment was
necessary \so as to cure the defects which experience [had] shown to exist in its execution."90
Among the proposed improvements was provision for special examiners at the ports of San Francisco and
Chicago, ports of entry for large amounts of tea.91 While it is not clear from the legislative history, there are
suggestions that only the port of New York had a qualied examiner. This would explain the inclusion of a
salary raise only for the New York examiner.92 Certainly it would be of great concern if revenue collectors
untrained in examining tea inspected the large amounts of tea entering the country through San Francisco
88Id.
89H. Rep. No. 48-665 (1884).
90Id.
91Id.
92Id. However, the raise could also be explained by the fact that the largest amount of tea entered the United States through
the port of New York. Id.
14and Chicago.
Additionally, the arbitration process would be improved by providing that dierences of opinion as to a tea's
quality and purity among the board of arbitrators could be resolved by \appeal to chemical analysis."93
While the 1883 Act did not actually forbid such testing, not did it specically provide for any kind of
scientic analysis. Though the contemporary legislative history does not detail the reasoning behind this
amendment, later complaints about the arbitration process indicate that its results were based on little more
than the arbitrators' subjective opinions.94 Any kind of objective standard would streamline the arbitration
process as well as increasing its fairness.
The substantive prohibitions were also to be tightened. First, an attempt to provide an enforcement standard
for the prohibition of tea \adulterated with spurious leaf"95 was proposed. Tea containing more than 8% ash
was to be forbidden entry.96 Under the 1883 Act, examiners had discretion to decide how much adulteration
was `too much.'
Second, tea dust, which could be \used only for adulteration"97 was to be excluded, in order to reduce the
possibility of adulteration after inspection by customs. While tea dust by denition was supposed to be
composed of very ne particles of tea leaves, most material imported as \tea dust" had very little actual tea
in it.98 As impurities in tea dust were extremely dicult to detect,99 absent a blanket prohibition of tea
dust, examination by customs ocials could do nothing to prevent the entry of the false article. As a result,
it was extremely easy for dishonest dealers to adulterate their tea locally.
The draft legislation was circulated to the industry, which generally supported the amendment.100 However,
93Id.
94H. Rep. No. 54-1529, 2 (1897).
9522 Stat. 451, supra note 69, x 1.
96Letter from the Importers and Grocers' Exchange of New York, supra note 86.
97H. Rep. No 48-665 (1884). Note that this was before tea dust and tea sweepings were commonly used as raw materials in
the manufacturing of caeine and theine.
98Taylor, supra note 59, at 194. Taylor found that most tea dust consisted mainly of \raspberry leaves or other worthless
substance purposely reduced to a ne powder to make detection dicult." Id.
99Id. Taylor, in 1889, was able to detect adulterations in tea dust with diculty, and only with the use of a microscope. Id.
100Letter from the Importers and Grocers' Exchange of New York, supra note 86. The writers generally \approve of the
15at least some industry members were unconvinced that the legislation was necessary.101 One provision
in particular, the percentage limitation on teas adulterated with ash leaves, inspired protest from the tea
trade.102 The House Committee on Ways and Means unanimously recommended passage, but in reporting
the bill to Congress, the committee suggested that the ash limitation be deleted:
If the law be amended as proposed by the bill herewith submitted, the committee are of
opinion that exhausted, adulterated, and poisonous teas will not hereafter nd their way to
the United States as they have heretofore done, and that the public health will thereby be
greatly promoted.103
However, the House did not pass the legislation.104
A second attempt to amend the Tea Importation Act was made six years later, in 1890.105 In reporting
the bill to the House, the Committee on Ways and Means once again focussed attention on the problems
presented by the importation of tea dust. Strong language was addressed to this particular failing of the
1883 Act:
This law is now evaded by the importation in large quantities of \tea-dust," which
is afterwards mingled with tea, and the admixture sold to our people as the pure article.
This tea is full of dirt and deleterious substances, and its importation and sale as an article
of food is a fraud upon all consumers.106
Two other alterations in the regulatory scheme were included in the House bill. First, under the 1883 Act,
the samples to be inspected were not drawn by customs ocials, but by the importers themselves.107 The
new legislation would have closed this opportunity to evade thorough inspection of imported tea. Under the
proposed amendments... " Id.
101Id. The letter states, \experience has proved that the safeguards imposed by the present act are amply sucient, if the
provisions thereof are strictly and honestly administered..." Id.
102Letter from A.P. Ketchum, Chief Appraiser of the New York Custom House (Feb. 4, 1884), as reprinted in Ex. Doc. 48-61,
Part 2 (1884). Ketchum writes, \The opposition... to the fth section of the proposed act, seems to be practically unanimous
and certainly is very earnest." Id. Notably, Ketchum also urges that industry members \should receive the fullest consideration
in respect to any suggestions which they have to make with regard to any change in the existing tea law." Id.
104A related bill, S. 2037, passed the Senate but was not voted on in the House. 48 Cong. Rec. S5334.
105See H. Rep. No. 51-2317 (1890) (reporting on H. R. 16720, an amended version of H. R. 8744).
10722 Stat. 451, supra note 69, x 2.
16proposed amendment, customs examiners would take the samples.108 Second, the composition of the arbi-
tration boards was to be changed, \the present requirement of the statute not being entirely satisfactory."109
All three amendments received approval from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury.110
Though the Committee on Ways and Means reported favorably on the bill as amended,111 as with the earlier
reform attempt, the legislation did not pass the House. To a certain degree, both of these failures can be
attributed to the relative indierence on the part of industry. The Americans in the tea trade did not object
to the draft legislation as reported to Congress, but neither did the bills receive the more intense lobbying
eort behind the 1883 Act.
1897: An enduring regulatory program is enacted
On March 2, 1897, fourteen years to the day after the 1883 Act became law, Congress enacted \An Act To
prevent the importation of impure and unwholesome tea."112 This new Tea Importation Act constituted an
overhaul of the 1883 Act's regulatory system. In fact, the 1897 Act repealed the 1883 Act as a whole113
and started with a clean slate, instituting several major changes in the regulatory scheme. Some of these
changes were the very similar to reforms proposed in 1884 and 1890.
First, the substantive prohibitions were tightened; tea would be examined for \quality"114 as well as for
108H. Rep. No. 51-2317, at 1 (1890), quoting a letter from Acting Secretary of the Treasury Batcheller.
109Id. The committee report does not specify the changes to be made.
110Id. The report quotes Batcheller, who suggested changes in the proposed legislation. Id. The original bill, H.R. 8744,
provided for the appointment of additional tea examiners, which the Secretary thought unnecessary. Id. Additionally, the bill
would have changed the source of the examiners' salaries, which would have been drawn from the appropriation to customs
for collecting revenues. Id. The Secretary thought this change inappropriate, as tea inspections had little to do with revenue
collection. Id. The Committee adopted the changes suggested by the Secretary, and the bill as amended was reported as H.R.
16720. Id.
111Id.
11229 Stat. 604, supra note 2.
113Id. x 12.
114Id. xx 1, 3.
17\purity"115 and \tness for consumption."116 The motivation behind this provision was not discussed in
either the House or the Senate Committee reports. However, it can be surmised that this was an attempt to
improve the quality of teas available to the American consumer. Additionally, it is likely that the provision
worked to protect certain American tea dealers from having to compete with low quality (and low cost)
product.
Second, the Secretary of the Treasury was given the authority to adopt federal standards for what tea would
be allowed into the United States.117 Under the new law, the Secretary appointed a seven-member board
of experts in teas, later to be known as the Board of Tea Experts, who would recommend standards to the
Secretary.118 These seven individuals served for one-year terms, and were at all times subject to removal by
the Secretary.119 Each expert received a $50 per year salary, to be paid out of the portion of the customs
budgets allocated for the collection of duties.120
Under the Board of Tea Experts' recommendation, the Secretary of the Treasury would adopt uniform stan-
dards of purity, quality, and tness for consumption for all varieties of tea imported into the country.121
Samples conforming to each of the standards would be placed at customs in New York, San Francisco,
Chicago, and other places as the Secretary saw t.122 Importers and dealers in tea were entitled to duplicate
samples at cost.123
The lack of standards under the 1883 Act had been one of its greatest aws. Because there were no stan-
dards, consistent enforcement of the 1883 Act was impossible. Examiners, whether \duly qualied"124 or
115Id.; see also 22 Stat. 451, supra note 69, x 2.
11629 Stat. 604, supra note 2, xx 1, 3; see also 22 Stat. 451, supra note 69, x 2.
11729 Stat. 604, supra note 2, x 3.
118Id. x 2.
119Id.
120Id.
121Id. x 3.
122Id.
123Id.
12422 Stat. 451, supra note 69, x 5.
18not, had only their subjective \momentary impressions" to guide their determinations.125 Impure and even
dangerous tea was released to the United States market and purchased by consumers.126 The lack of stan-
dards presented problems for importers as well: \Importers have imported the same grade of tea admitted
during the previous season and found, to their consternation, that in the second season it was excluded, no
reason being given beyond the inspector's or the arbitrator's impressions...."127 Importers could not rely on
past experience; every shipment of tea to the United States became a gamble. In summary, \The public are
suering; the importers are suering; and all because there is no standard or guide..."128
Third, the arbitration process of the 1883 Act was scrapped entirely and an administrative appellate proce-
dure was put it its place.129 The Secretary was to designate a board of three United States general appraisers
to sit as an appellate body.130 This Board of General Appraisers, to be known in later years are the Board
of Tea Appeals, were not expected to be tea experts themselves; they were furnished with the statutory
authority to obtain the advice of \persons skilled in the examination of teas."131 When such expert advice
was utilized, the expert was to be paid a \compensation not exceeding ve dollars" for a single case.132
Unlike under the 1883 Act, the right to appeal was provided to the collector of the port, as well as the
importer.133
The arbitration provisions under the 1883 Act were especially troublesome to importers and legislators alike.
The arbitration boards were composed of three members, one chosen by the government, one chosen by the
importer, with these two to come to a mutual decision on the third.134 While arbitration might have seemed
an amicable way of resolving conict, in practice, \The arbitrations [were] in many cases a farce, and always
125S. Rep. No. 54-1527, at 2 (1897).
126H. Rep. No. 54-3029 (1897).
127S. Rep. No. 54-1527, at 2 (1897).
128Id.
12929 Stat. 604, supra note 2, x 6.
130Id.
131Id. x 8.
132Id.
133Id. x 6.
13422 Stat. 451, supra note 69, x 4.
19variable and uncertain."135
In most disputes, the government would choose a strict arbitrator and the importer would choose a lenient
arbitrator.136 Choosing the third arbitrator could take up to a month.137 This was because the arbitrators,
like the examiners, were left without objective guidance - almost invariably ended in a two to three vote
based on opinion alone, with the third arbitrator's vote being determinative.138 Thus, the selection of the
third arbitrator was often more important to the result than the quality of the tea.
Because the arbitrators' determinations were discretionary, they were unreviewable.139 As there was no
\danger of being proven dishonest," the entire system was rife with opportunities for inspectors and arbitra-
tors to act on the basis of favoritism rather than the quality of the tea.140 The unfairness of the arbitration
process under the 1883 Act contributed to the bankruptcy of at least one respected importer, which likely
contributed to the industry position in favor of increased regulation.141 In summarizing the problems, the
Committee on Commerce reported, \The consequences of the present law are that thousands of dollars are
lost unjustly to strictly honest importers every year, while millions of pounds of tea unt for use are being
constantly admitted...."142
Fourth, to further standardized enforcement, the 1897 Act improved the inspection procedure with several
minor alterations. Recall that under the 1883 Act, if the port of entry lacked a qualied examiner, any
customs ocial was free to conduct the tea examination.143 Under the 1897 Act, if there was no qualied
examiner at the port of entry, tea samples forwarded to a qualied examiner at another location.144 As pro-
135S. Rep. No. 54-1527, at 2 (1897).
136Id.
137Id.
138Id.
139Id. Also stating, \All this injustice may occur while inspectors or arbitrators are strictly honest, but without any standard
or guide for their judgement. But it is dicult to estimate the disaster is any should not be honest." Id.
140Id.
141Id. The house of Purdon &Wiggin oered approximately 200,000 pounds of Amoy tea for import. The tea was rejected
after arbitration, \causing the house a disastrous loss, which helped to bring about their nal bankruptcy." Id. A short time
later, another importer successfully imported a shipment twice as large of the very same grade of tea after arbitration. Id.
142Id.
14322 Stat. 451, supra note 69, x 5.
14429 Stat. 604, supra note 2, x 7.
20posed in the 1890 House bill,145 examiners (and arbitrators) were specically authorized to utilize chemical
analysis in evaluating tea oered for import.146 Additionally, the Secretary of the Treasury was granted the
discretion to have the examiner, rather than the importer, draw tea samples for inspection.147 This was a
compromise position between the 1883 Act and the 1890 bill. In the 1883 Act, examiners could only draw
samples if they had reason to believe the samples drawn by the importer were not representative;148 the
1890 bill would have required customs ocials to draw the samples.149
Finally, the new Tea Importation Act imposed the penalty of forfeiture when an importer attempted to
re-import previously rejected tea.150 As with the 1883 Act, importers had 6 months to re-export rejected
tea.151 However, under the previous law, the import prohibitions could be evaded because rejected tea
could be oered for import a second time without penalty. Although this practice could not be described
as a common one, there were frequent reports tea being successfully re-imported, sometimes even passing
inspection by the same examiner at the same port.152
After fourteen years, the failings of the 1883 Act had become clear to everyone involved. Consumers, dis-
satised with the quality of tea available on the market, were turning to other beverages in signicant
numbers.153 Industry, too, was desperate for systemic reform154 and the Secretary of the Treasury sup-
ported the movement.155 The United States legislature was eager to accommodate these rapidly converging
145H.R. 16720, 51st Cong. (1890).
14629 Stat. 604, supra note 2, x 7.
147Id. x 4.
14822 Stat. 451, supra note 69, x 2.
149H. Rep. No. 51-2317, at 1 (1890).
15029 Stat. 604, supra note 2, x 9.
151Id. x 6.
152S. Rep. No. 54-1527, at 2 (1897).
153Id. at 1, (stating, \while the per capita consumption of tea is increasing in Great Britain statistics show a decided reduction
in this country").
154Id. at 3. \The petition for this amendment has been signed by all the leading importers of tea in the United States,
representing all the capital invested in the tea business in rst hands. The petitions have been signed by all the leading
importers and wholesale houses of New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Portland, Baltimore, and San Francisco." Id.
155Id. at 1, (stating, \The Treasury Department is fully alive to the situation and has cooperated with the committee...").
21interests. Bills were introduced in both the Senate156 and the House157 to deal with the issue. The House
Committee on Ways and Means158 and the Senate Committee on Commerce,159 cooperating with the Trea-
sury Department160, revised the proposed legislation and reported back to both Houses of Congress in favor
of its passage.161
The Senate committee reported, \It is well known that the people of the United States receive on an av-
erage poorer teas than the consumers of any other civilized country. Much of the merchandise sold as tea
is unwholesome and is disposed of at an enormous prot."162 Likewise, the House committee stated, \It
is believed that it will do much to relieve our people of much of the worthless and deleterious stu that is
now impose d upon them. The evil is widespread, and should this bill furnish a remedy great good would
result."163
In a relatively short period of time, the Senate bill was approved by both houses of Congress and signed
into law by the President. The system put in place by the 1897 Act regulated the importation of tea into
the United States until its repeal in 1996 { ninety-nine years after its enactment. Although, from time to
time, enforcement responsibility for the Tea Importation Act was shued from one administrative agency
to another, the basic structures, policies, and substantive rules remained largely intact.
156S. 3581, 54th Cong. (1897).
157H.R. 9946, 54th Cong. (1897).
158H. Rep. No. 54-3029 (1897).
159S. Rep. No. 54-1527 (1897).
160Id. at 1; see also H. Rep. No. 54-3029 (1897).
161S. Rep. No. 54-1527, at 1 (1897) (reporting favorably on S. 3725, 54th Cong. (1897)); see also H. Rep. No. 54-3029 (1897)
(reporting in favor of H.R. 10350, 54th Cong. (1897)).
162S. Rep. No. 54-1527, at 1 (1897).
163H. Rep. No. 54-3029 (1897).
221898-1900: Jurisdictional bars thwart
Importers' attempts to invalidate the 1897 Act
The earliest litigants challenging enforcement of the 1897 Tea Importation Act failed in their eorts. In-
stead of seeking monetary damages after tea had been destroyed by customs,164 these plaintis sought to
prevent destruction of their tea. They asked federal courts to enjoin nal decisions by the Board of General
Appraisers, and therefore faced jurisdiction obstacles that proved to be insurmountable.
First, the 1897 Act did not provide for judicial review of the decisions of either port examiners or the Board
of General Appraisers. Federal courts found that they were unable to exercise direct review of administrative
determinations under the Act. Nor were federal courts free to enjoin customs ocials from enforcing such an
administrative judgement. For a court to issue an injunction, it had to exercise equity jurisdiction. While the
federal courts possessed equity jurisdiction, it was extremely limited: an injunction, even against unlawful
government activity, was available only when remedies at law, i.e., monetary damages, were insucient.165
As the plaintis seeking injunctions were engaged in importing tea, invariably an economic activity, mone-
tary damages were considered especially suited to remedy illegal seizures or destruction of tea under the Tea
Importation Act.
Sang Lung et al. v. Jackson,166 decided in 1898, was the earliest reported case involving the Tea Importation
Act.167 In Sang Lung, a federal circuit court refused to issue an injunction against Jackson, the collector
for the port of San Francisco.168 The plaintis, Chinese nationals residing in the United States, sought to
keep Jackson from destroying several shipments of \canton tea" that had arrived in San Francisco shortly
164Destruction would occur if rejected tea was not exported within six months, pursuant to 29 Stat. 604, supra note 2, x 6.
165This rule has subsequently been relaxed. Today courts are more willing to issue injunctions, partially due to the 1933
merger of chancery and equity jurisdiction under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
166Sang Lung et al. v. Jackson, 85 F. 502 (C.C.N.D.Cal. 1898).
167Notably, there does not appear to have been any litigation surrounding the 1883 Act.
168Sang Lung, 85 F. at 508.
23after the 1897 Act took eect.169 The Treasury regulations in place at the time of the administrative ruling
set no standard for \canton tea."170 Therefore, both the examiner and the Board of General Appraisers
rejected the tea for not conforming to government standards.171 The plaintis refused to export their tea,
and Jackson was set to destroy it once the requisite six months had passed.172 Before he could do so, the
plaintis led in suit in federal court, challenging his authority to destroy their tea, arguing that the Treasury
regulations, under which the tea was rejected, were unauthorized by the Act.173
First, the court noted that the 1897 Act did not provide for judicial review of the administrative adjudica-
tion, stating, \The act of congress contemplates that the decision of the board of general appraisers shall
be nal, and not subject to revision by the courts."174 Thus, the court was unable to reverse the decision
of the Board of General Appraisers on direct review. The court continued, explaining that the presumption
of unreviewability was qualied by a limited equity jurisdiction.175 If the plaintis could show irreparable
injury by virtue of interference with a vested right, the court would issue an injunction.
The plaintis argued that they had a vested right to import tea not inferior to government standards.176
The Treasury regulations, as interpreted, deprived them of this right, as the regulations eectively precluded
tea from entering the country that was equal to government standards in quality, purity, and tness for
consumption.177 The plaintis reasoned that they had a right to bring their tea into the country under the
Tea Importation Act, and it was this right the regulations interfered with, not any constitutional right to
property. The regulations caused them irreparable injury, as they would be precluded from bringing \canton
tea" into the country, thereby destroying their business.178 Interference with this right could not be cured
169Id. at 503.
170Id.
171Id.
172Id.
173Id. at 504.
174Id. at 508.
175Id. at 507.
176Id.
177Id. at 503.
178Id.
24with mere monetary damages, and therefore an injunction was proper.179
However, the court the found that the plaintis possessed no such vested right.180 It noted that the claimed
right didn't exist under the Constitution, as Congress had plenary power to prohibit the importation of any
class of tea it chose.181 Further, Congress had used its plenary power to make the Board's decisions nal
and unreviewable.182 Therefore, the court revealed, Congress hadn't actually prohibited the importation of
tea not meeting government standards.183 Rather, the Act prohibited entry of tea not receiving approval
from the examiner or Board.184 The determination of whether teas met government standards was entirely
in the discretion of the administrative agency: \[T]he right to import tea into the United States is made by
the act of congress to depend entirely upon the nal judgement of the board of general appraisers...."185
In making this determination, the circuit court interpreted the Tea Importation Act dierently than later
courts would, and its ruling is somewhat dicult to reconcile with the later cases. The 1897 Act clearly
species that the Secretary was supposed to x standards for \all kinds of tea imported into the United
States."186 It is certainly possible that \canton tea" simply slipped through the cracks, and perhaps it could
not be expected that the rst set of standards would cover everything they should. However, \canton tea"
was in general use across the United States and had been regularly imported from China for at least 30
years.187 So, arguably, the Secretary had an enforceable statutory duty to set standards applicable to the
plaintis' tea.
Be that as it may, the circuit court found that the only right at issue was the plaintis' property right in
their tea. Obviously, the plaintis would not sustain irreparable injury by reason of the tea's destruction.188
179Id.
180Id. at 507.
181Id.
182Id. at 508.
183Contrary to the statement in 29 Stat. 604, supra note 2, x 1.
184Sang Lung, 85 F. at 507.
185Id.
18629 Stat. 604, supra note 2, x 3.
187Sang Lung, 85 F. at 503.
188Id. at 504.
25If it later turned out that the collector improperly destroyed the tea, monetary damages would be a sucient
remedy: \[I]f the defendant should destroy the tea referred to in the bill,... damages would be an adequate
compensation for any loss...."189 Therefore, the court could not issue an injunction, as its equity jurisdiction
did not extend so far, and the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.190
Thus, the real issue in the case was never reached { whether tea could be properly rejected on the sole ground
that there were no applicable standards. The court did not even reach the issue as to whether the Board had
correctly interpreted the Treasury regulations to exclude the plaintis' tea. In fact, it stated explicitly, \I do
not deem it necessary to determine whether such regulations, property construed, prohibit the admission of
Canton tea, if it is not inferior in quality to either of the special standards named in such regulations."191
In 1900, the Supreme Court had its rst opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the Tea Importation
Act for in the case of Cruickshank v. Bidwell.192 In Cruickshank, the Supreme Court armed the lower
court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.193 The lower court had denied the plaintis an injunction against
the collector of customs at the port of New York.194 The collector refused to release the tea to the plaintis
unless they allowed him to mark the invoices and other papers relating to the teas \condemned under the
laws of the United States" and gave \security satisfactory to him" that the tea would be exported.195
The plaintis argued that marking the teas as condemned \renders the said teas worthless for export and
entry or sale in the markets of other countries...."196 The fact that the importers could not gain possession
of their tea in the rst place, and that it would be especially marked as condemned in the second place,
meant they would be unable to sell it { even for export - in the U.S. market \for the reason that dealers
189Id.
190Id. at 508.
191Id. at 507.
192Cruickshank v. Bidwell,176 U.S. 73 (1900).
193Id. at 82.
194Id. at 74.
195Id. at 78.
196Id.
26will not purchase or handle the said goods under the cloud or threat of illegality...."197 For this reason, the
plaintis asserted that the 1897 Act was unconstitutional.198
However, the Court did not reach the merits, as the case was dismissed for lack of equity jurisdiction, on
the grounds that \no tenable basis for equity interposition was shown."199 For a unanimous Court, Chief
Justice Fuller wrote:
It is settled that the mere fact that a law is unconstitutional does not entitle a party
to relief by injunction against proceedings in compliance therewith, but it must appear that
he has no adequate remedy by the ordinary processes of the law, or that the case falls under
some recognized head of equity jurisdiction.200
Although the plaintis claimed that they would suer \irreparable injury" if their teas were condemned or
destroyed, they oered no evidence to support the assertion.201 The Court commented, \in this particular
we think the bill fatally defective."202 The plaintis also claimed that their \right to import and deal in
teas" was destroyed by the collector's acts.203 To this assertion, the Court responded, \The law does not
prohibit the importation of teas coming up to the standards, and it is dicult to perceive the elements of
irreparable injury in the denial of permission to import inferior teas."204
1904: The Supreme Court upholds the 1897 Act.
Perhaps the most litigious person in American tea history is Mr. William J. Butteld, who brought no less
than three cases challenging the constitutionality of the 1897 Act to the Supreme Court in a single year.
197Id.
198Id.
199Id. at 82.
201Id. at 81.
202Id.
203Id. at 79.
204Id. at 82.
27The most important of these cases is Butteld v. Stranahan,205 which upheld the Act as constitutional in an
opinion by Justice White. The two remaining cases, Butteld v. United States206 and Butteld v. Bidwell,207
decided on the same day as Stranahan, were disposed of with only cursory opinions, also by Justice White.
In Stranahan, Butteld sued the collector of the port of New York for damages arising out of the destruction
of his tea, pursuant to x 6 of the1897 Act.208 In 1902, Mr. Butteld's rm oered several lots of tea for
import.209 The tea was examined at the port of New York under Treasury standards, and 8 packages were
found to be inferior in quality.210 The tea had not been adulterated, and was t for consumption;211 the
only complaint to be made about it was that it was inferior in \cup quality", i.e., avor.212 Butteld's rm
appealed the examiner's determination to the Board of General Appraisers, but the Board armed that
the tea was inferior to the government standard.213 After this decision, Mr. Butteld bought his partner's
interest in the tea.214 However, by the time Butteld attempted to export his tea, over six months had
passed and Butteld was notied that his tea would be destroyed.215
Butteld sued Stranahan to recover damages for the alleged wrongful seizure, removal, and destruction of his
tea.216 Butteld made two arguments under the Constitution that his tea was improperly destroyed. First,
he argued that the Secretary of the Treasury's standard setting authority was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power.217 Second, he argued that the 1897 Act violated due process because it did not provide
importers with a hearing at any point.218
205Butteld v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
206Butteld v. United States, 192 U.S. 499 (1904).
207Butteld v. Bidwell, 192 U.S. 498 (1904).
208Stranahan, 192 U.S. at 475.
209Id. at 472.
210Id. at 474.
211Id. at 477.
212Id. at 475.
213Id.
214Id.
215Id.
216Id.
217Id. at 491.
218Id. at 492.
28In determining that the Act did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation, the Court asserted that the
authority delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury was not \legislative." Although the Secretary had some
discretion, Congress had xed a primary standard when it expressed the Act's purpose to exclude tea \[of]
inferior purity, or unt for consumption, or presumably so because of their inferior quality."219 Therefore,
the power delegated to the Secretary, even the power to promulgate regulations, was a \mere executive duty
to eectuate the legislative policy declared in the statute."220
The Court also ruled that there was no due process violation. While an importer has constitutionally
protected property rights, he has no constitutional right to bring that property into the country.221 The
Court armed that the Congressional power to regulate imports was plenary, a \complete power... over
foreign commerce."222 It followed that there could be no vested right to import tea, and therefore rejections
of tea for importation were not subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause.223 Therefore, neither
customs ocials nor the Board of General Appraisers was constitutionally required to hold a hearing prior
to rejecting tea under the government standards.224
The destruction of the tea, however, involved a deprivation of property and therefore was subject to due
process limitations.225 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that no hearing was required by the Constitution.226
The Court assumed, without so holding, that the Act itself did not provide the right to a hearing.227 Notice
and the six months waiting period, both of which Butteld received, were sucient procedural protections
under the Constitution.228 Though Butteld received no hearing, he was fully aware that the tea would
be destroyed once he failed to export it within six months after the nal decision of the Board of General
219Id. at 496.
220Id.
221Id. at 493.
222Id.
223Id. at 497.
224Id.
225Id.
226Id. at 498.
227Id. at 497.
228Id. at 498.
29Appraisers.229 The Tea Importation Act was found constitutional.
The rulings in Butteld v. United States and Butteld v. Bidwell followed directly and logically from the
Stranahan holding. In Butteld v. Bidwell, Butteld sued a dierent collector at the port of New York for
damages over 4 packages of tea.230 Unlike in Stranahan, Butteld did not allow his tea to be destroyed, but
instead exported the rejected tea within the six month period allowed by the statute.231
Butteld had argued in the Second Circuit that the statute's reference to \quality" did not mean that tea
could be excluded for inferior quality alone.232 Utilizing the legislative history, the Second Circuit rejected
Butteld's assertion. Congress had specically added the word \quality" to the 1897 Act for the purpose
of raising the quality of tea on the American market and protect consumers from \worthless rubbish;" the
term had not been present in the 1883 Act.233 Stranahan conrmed this reading of the statute,234 rendering
Butteld v. Bidwell an `easy' case.
The circumstances of Butteld v. United States were, again, slightly dierent. As in Butteld v. Bidwell,
Butteld exported several lots of tea after they was rejected under the government standards by the Board
of General Appraisers.235 However, unlike in the other cases, he attempted to re-import the tea.236 Recall
that under the 1883 Act, importers frequently did this in order to evade the importation prohibition.237 The
re-imported tea was forfeited and destroyed under x 9 of the 1897 Act. In a suit for damages, Butteld's
only argument was that the Act was unconstitutional.238 Under Stranahan's determination that the Act
229Id.
230Butteld v. Bidwell, 192 U.S. at 498. Note that this Bidwell is the same collector who was the defendant in Cruickshank,
decided by the Supreme Court four years earlier.
231Id.
232Butteld v. Bidwell, 96 F. 328, 329 (2nd Cir. 1899).
233Id.
234Stranahan, 192 U.S. at 494. The Court echoed the Second Circuit's language in describing Congress' insertion of the term
\quality," stating, \the word was industriously inserted to make the act a more stringent substitute for the existing legislation."
Id.; see also Butteld v. Bidwell, 96 F. at 329.
235Butteld v. United States, 192 U.S. at 500.
236Id.
237S. Rep. No. 54-1527, at 2 (1897).
238Butteld v. United States, 192 U.S. at 500.
30was indeed constitutional, the Court held for the United States in a one-paragraph opinion.
1908: The Tea Act is amended to exempt
tea dust under special circumstances
In 1908, a Congress recognized a legitimate use for inferior tea products such as tea dust: the manufacturing
of caeine, theine, and other useful chemicals.239 In 1884, the House Committee on Ways and Means had
supported prohibiting these products entry, reporting that tea dust was \only used for adulteration."240
While the 1897 Act had not expressly provided for exclusion of tea dust, any standards the Secretary of the
Treasury would x were likely to surpass tea dust in quality. However, caeine and theine could be produced
as easily from tea dust as from tea passing government standards.241 As tea dust was far less expensive than
quality tea, it made economic sense for it to be imported for the limited purpose of chemical manufacture.
Twice in 1905 the Senate Committee on Commerce reported favorably on bills that would amend the act to
allow entry of tea sweepings for this limited purpose. The rst, S. 5600, was reported too late in the Third
session of the 58th Congress to be considered.242 The second, S. 1548, \a like bill" was reported early in the
First session of the 59th Congress (largely by quoting the report on the previous bill).243 This bill failed to
23935 Stat. 163 (May 16, 1908), codied at 21 U.S.C. x 41, substantially amended by 76 Stat. 77 (May 24, 1962), further
amended by 102 Stat. 1158 (August, 23, 1988), repealed by 110 Stat. 1198 (April 9, 1996). In 1962, the language regarding
the exemption was replaced with a reference to the Tari Schedule of the United States. 76 Stat. 77. The Tari Schedule, not
included in the U.S. Code, could well have preserved the exemption, although this is not clear. In 1988, a minor change was
made in statutory language to refer to the renamed Harmonized Tari Schedule. 102 Stat. 1158.
240H. Rep. No. 48-665, supra note 103.
241S. Rep No. 58-4367, at 1 (1905).
242See S. Rep. No. 59-7, at 1 (1905).
243See id.
31pass the Senate as well. However, three years later in 1908 the amendment passed, despite concerns that
the amendment would undermine enforcement of the 1897 Act: \The only objection would seem to lie in a
possibility that these tea wastes might be sold as tea to be used as a beverage."244
In the 1908 amendment, an exemption was created in the Tea Act to allow manufacturers to bring inferior
teas, including \tea waste, tea siftings, [and] tea sweepings," into the country.245 The importers had to
give bond that the inferior teas would be used \for the sole purpose of manufacturing theine, caeine, or
other chemical products whereby the identity and character of the original material is entirely destroyed or
changed."246
Notably, the Secretary of the Treasury consulted the Board of Tea Experts in considering the amendments.247
A majority of the Board believed that enforcement of the Tea Act would be compromised if the amendment
passed. However, the Secretary along with a minority of the Board, believed otherwise: \the minority is of
the opinion that the intent and purpose of the tea act can be fully safeguarded under the proposed bill by
proper departmental regulations, and I concur in this opinion...."248
Precisely why the 1908 amendment was deemed necessary is unclear. Only six months after passage of the
1897 Act, the Secretary of the Treasury had promulgated a regulation to allow these products entry for the
purpose of theine and caeine production.249 However, this regulation required the raw product to be mixed
244Id.
24535 Stat. 163, supra note 239.
246Id.
247See letter of H.A. Taylor, Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Feb. 9, 1905), as printed in S. Rep. No. 59-7, supra note 242,
at 2.
248Id.
249Schaefer Alkaloid Works v. United States, 7 U.S.Cust.App. 128, 130 (1916). The regulation was passed on August 12,
1897. Id. Schaefer did not involve enforcement of the Tea Act. Rather, it answered the question whether tea sweepings were
legally \tea" for tari purposes if they were mixed with lime and asafetida. The court found they were, and therefore subjected
the product to a duty of 1 cent per pound. Id. at 132.
32with a small amount of lime and asafetida to make \impossible the unlawful use of rejected teas."250 The
amendment \made it unnecessary to mix lime and asafetida with tea sweepings in order to permit of their
entry at the customhouse,"251 and instead required a bond from importers.252 It is possible that the 1908
amendment was passed for economic reasons, i.e., to allow tea dust to be imported more cheaply.
Further litigation claries the scope of the Tea Act
Butteld v. United States left open the question whether the forfeiture penalty for attempting to re-import
rejected tea could be applied to an importer who was unaware that his tea had been previously examined
and rejected. In 1913, a New York district court ruled that it could in United States v. Twenty Chests of
Tea; 253 the forfeiture provision contained no requirement of scienter.
In Twenty Chests of Tea, customs ocials had rejected a shipment of tea, and pursuant to x 6 of the Tea
Act, the importer exported the tea to Canada.254 When the importer sold the tea, he did not advise the
purchaser that it had been rejected by U.S. customs.255 The tea subsequently passed through the hands
of several merchants, none of whom were aware that the tea was ineligible for importation into the United
States.256 The tea was eventually sold to Kearney Bros. Limited specically for the purpose of importing
it into the United States.257 The vendor, himself unaware of the tea's history, represented to Kearney Bros.
250Id. at 130. This preparation was a common requirement; apparently the British had a similar rule. Id. at 132.
251Id. at 131.
25235 Stat. 163, supra note 239.
253United States v. Twenty Chests of Tea, 208 F. 89 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
254Id. at 89.
255Id. at 90.
256Id.
257Id.
33that the tea conformed to United States standards and was eligible for importation.258
In the forfeiture action, Kearney Bros. argued that, because they were innocent of their tea's defect, it was
not subject to forfeiture.259 They also asserted that the examiner who had initially rejected the tea should
have stamped or labeled the packages in such a way as to make it obvious that they had been rejected.260
However, the court determined that the Tea Act did not require the examiner or the collector to do mark
the tea as condemned.261
Expressing a concern that customs must not be required to reexamine previously rejected tea \again and
again at the same or dierent ports of entry,"262 the court held the importers responsible for knowing the
history of their tea. It stated, \When this tea was examined and rejected and sent out of the country, the
owner and all who purchased from such owner thereafter were bound at their peril to know the status of
such tea...."263
The court justied its position by stating that due inquiry would have revealed the tea's legal status.264
It also reasoned that Kearney Bros. could have determined for themselves that the tea was not up to
U.S. standards by comparing it with the government samples available from the Treasury Department.265
It concluded, \On the whole, I do not see that any injustice is done importers by casting on them the
responsibility...."266
* * * * *
258Id.
259Id. at 91.
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262Id. at 93.
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34While Butteld must be considered the most active Tea Act litigant, the rm of Carter, Macy & Co., Inc.
comes in a close second. Though the rm brought only one case to the Supreme Court, Waite v. Macy,267 it
was more successful than Butteld in its challenge under the Tea Act. However, before recounting the rm's
victory at the Supreme Court, it is worth noting its previous defeat in a separate case, Macy v. Loeb.268
In Macy v. Loeb, a 1913 case, the rm sued a revenue collector for the port of New York to enjoin the
destruction of its tea on the theory that the Tea Importation Act required a pre-deprivation hearing.269 The
Second Circuit determined that the Tea Importation Act did not grant importers the statutory right to a
hearing at any state.270 It held that the 1897 Act did not require that the initial examination of tea, or any
appeal taken to the Board of General Appraisers for that matter, occur in the importer's presence.271 The Act
provided no opportunity for the importer to oer evidence or testimony at any stage.272 Under Stranahan,
the lack of hearing was perfectly constitutional, 273 and the Second Circuit rearmed that, \Congress has
undoubtedly the power to exclude all teas, or to admit them under the most arbitrary regulations it may
choose to prescribe."274 To the importers' novel assertion that the 1897 Act did not apply to teas equal to
or above the standards set by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Second Circuit colorfully responded,
This is a mistaken idea. The act provides in substance that no tea shall come here unless
it meets the requirements of the statute { that is unless it can secure a nding from the
examiner or from the Board of General Appraisers that it is in their opinion up to standard.
Unless an importation of tea can secure such a nding it must be taken away, even though
it be the highest grade of brick tea that ever left China by caravan.275
This decision was not appealed.
267Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918).
268Macy v. Loeb, 205 F. 727 (2nd Cir. 1913).
269Id. at 727.
270Id. at 729.
271Id. at 728.
272Id.
273Stranahan, 192 U.S. at 497.
274Macy v. Loeb, 205 F. at 728.
35In 1918, the Supreme Court decided Waite v. Macy,276 which upheld an importer's right under the Tea
Importation Act to import colored tea. The case has an unusually well recorded history, as the opinions
of both the Second Circuit277 and the district court278 are reported. Macy and his business associates
attempted to import a shipment of green tea into the United States through the port of San Francisco.279
The tea was far superior in quality to the government standard, being worth approximately four times more
on the open market.280 However, it contained a \microscopic" amount of Prussian blue, a non-deleterious
substance commonly used to color green teas during that era.281 The government standard tea contained
no coloring matter whatsoever,282 but the rm's tea was in all other ways superior to the standard in terms
of purity.283
The examiner rejected the tea under Treasury regulations that eectively forbid the importation of articially
colored teas.284 Under Treasury Regulation 22, examiners were required to utilize the relatively new `Read
method' to test for the presence of coloring matter.285 Regulation 23 required that imported teas meet
government standards in all requisites, including the amount of articial coloring.286 That is, if a tea
contained more color than the government standard, the examiner was forced to reject it regardless of its
relative purity as a whole.287
Customs and the Treasury Department had apparently waged a long campaign to exclude colored tea from
entering the United States.288 Why it held such a policy not entirely clear; however it is very likely that the
authorities regarded the policy as the only eective method of deterring the use of color to deceive consumers
276Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918).
277Macy v. Browne, 224 F. 359 (2d Cir. 1915).
278Macy v. Browne, 215 F. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
279Id. at 457.
280Id. at 460.
281Id.
282Id.
283Id. Though the standard contained no color, it had a greater amount of other impurities. Id.
284Id. at 459.
285Id.
286Id.
287Id.
288Id.
36as to a tea's quality.289 As the Secretary of the Treasury had authority to x government standards, it was
within his discretion to choose sample teas that were absolutely free of coloring matter. Thus, assuming the
regulations were within the Secretary's authority, he could prevent the entry of all colored teas.
The importers appealed the examiner's decision to the Board of General Appraisers.290 However, before the
Board could render its decision, they cleverly sued the Board to enjoin it from applying Treasury Regulations
22 and 23, asserting that the regulations were not authorized by the Tea Act.291 The importers attacked the
Treasury's policy on two fronts: First, they argued, the Act did not provide for use of the Read method. The
1897 Act provided only that tea oered for importation \shall be tested according to the usages and customs
of the tea trade, including the testing of an infusion of the same in boiling water, and, if necessary, chemical
analysis."292 As the Read method was neither a chemical analysis, nor known to the tea trade in 1897,293
any regulation requiring its use must be unauthorized. Second, they asserted that the Act made three and
only three demands on tea oered for import: equivalent purity, quality, and tness for consumption. It was
outside the Secretary's authority to add a fourth requirement, unspecied by the legislation, i.e., relative
absence of coloring matter.294
In Macy v. Browne,295 the district court did not reach the merits of either argument, and for a now familiar
reason: dismissal due to lack of equity jurisdiction.296 However, Judge Hough provided some analysis of the
situation, and came to an interesting conclusion: the Board of General Appraisers was not strictly bound
by the Treasury Regulations. He reasoned:
289See Taylor, supra note 59, at 195.
290Macy v. Browne, 215 F. at 458.
291Id. at 460.
29229 Stat. 604, supra note 2, x 7.
293Macy v. Browne, 215 F. at 460.
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295The case was so captioned in both the district and circuit court proceedings.
296Macy v. Browne, 215 F. at 461.
37the powers of the tea board are derived from the statute itself { it is quite independent of
the Secretary.... The Secretary can no more compel the tea board to decide any question
lawfully coming before it in any particular way than he can so act toward any other lawfully
constituted tribunal.297
The \real question" before the Board was \whether the standard samples of tea are to be interpreted (so to
speak) narrowly or broadly."298 Whether failure to meet the government standard in respect to color alone
constituted inferiority in purity was \emphatically a matter of opinion, of discretion."299 Since the Board of
General Appraisers was not required to follow the Treasury Regulations, \it must have a chance to do right
before it is assumed to be about to go wrong."300
The Second Circuit reversed Judge Hough's dismissal of the case for want of equity jurisdiction.301 Rather
than simply remanding the case, the court ruled on the merits and found that Regulations 22 and 23 went
beyond the Secretary's statutory authority.302 The court remanded the case with instructions to issue an
injunction, ruling that, under the Tea Importation Act, tea could not be excluded solely on the basis that
it contained coloring matter.303 The circuit judges noted that if Congress had intended that teas should
be rejected on this basis alone, it would have expressed the policy in the Act.304 Hence, the regulatory
provisions were:
inconsistent with the statute, because they undertake to direct the tea board to reject tea...
although the board may be convinced... that the coloring matter is present in such harmless
quantities that the tea is not inferior to the statutory standards in purity, quality, or tness
for consumption.305
On the other hand, the Board's use of the Read method was entirely proper, regardless of whether it could
298Id.
299Id.
300Id.
301Macy v. Browne, 224 F. at 363.
302Id. at 362.
303Id. at 363.
304Id. at 361.
38be described as a \chemical" analysis.306 In fact, the Board was free to utilize \whatever means they may
adopt to satisfy themselves as to the degree of purity, or quality, or of tness [for consumption]."307
Macy v. Browne could be distinguished from Stranahan: while the Board \was the nal judge in its allotted
eld," as found in Stranahan, the Supreme Court's earlier opinion \did not indicate that the Board had any
power to extend that eld."308 Nor was the district court correct in nding the Board independent of the
Secretary of the Treasury: \The members of the board are appointed by the Secretary, who has the power
to remove them...."309
Strangely, the Second Circuit did not specically analyze the issue of equity jurisdiction. However, in order
to nd that the district court had equity jurisdiction, the judges must have believed that enforcement of the
regulations would have constituted an interference with a vested right that could not be adequately repaired
with monetary damages. Though the court indicated that rejection of the teas \would be an invasion of the
rights of complainants," it did not further explain its decision.310
In 1918, the Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit's ruling in Waite v. Macy, an opinion by Justice
Holmes. The Court agreed with the Second Circuit's assertion that Stranahan presented a dierent issue
than did the case at hand:
No doubt it is true that this Court cannot displace the judgement of the board in any matter
within its jurisdiction, but it is equally true that the board cannot enlarge the powers given
to it by statute and cover a usurpation by calling it a decision on purity, quality, or tness
for consumption.311
Holmes forcefully concluded, \It cannot be made a rule of law that any tea that has an innitesimal amount
of innocuous coloring matter is inferior in those respects to a standard that has a much greater amount
306Id. at 362.
307Id.
308Id. at 361.
309Id. at 362.
310Id.
39of other impurities and is worth only a quarter as much."312 Waite v. Macy, was the nal reported case
challenging the enforcement or constitutionality of the Tea Importation Act.313
A Short Summary of the Post-litigation years
In 1920, enforcement of the Tea Act was partially transferred to the Bureau of Chemistry in the Department of
Agriculture.314 Enforcement was now a cooperative endeavor between Chemistry and U.S. Customs.315 The
Board of Tea Experts was now to be appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.316 The Board of General
Appraisers was substituted with a new \United States Board of Tea Appeals," to be made up of three
employees of Agriculture, to be designated by the Secretary.317 Enforcement of the Act was subsequently
re-transferred several times.
In 1940, FDA (formerly Chemistry) was transferred from Agriculture to the Federal Security Agency.318
Additionally, Congress failed to appropriate any funds for enforcement of the Tea Act for scal year 1940-
312Id. at 609.
313However, another case relating to the Tea Act may be of interest to the reader, as it involves familiar a familiar party,
the rm of Carter, Macy & Co.: Carter, Macy & Co. v. Matthews, 220 A.D. 678, 222 N.Y.S. 472 (1927). One aspect of the
case was a controversy as to the interpretation of a contract that incorporated the government's tea standards. Carter, Macy
& Co., the plaintis, alleged they had a contract to import \government standard Congou tea" for the defendants. The teas
oered to the defendant were of a lesser market value (for aesthetic reasons) than government standard Congou. However, the
examiner at the port of New York had allowed the teas into the country under the Congou standard; under the Department
of Agriculture's regulations, tea examiners should not take the appearance of the tea leaves into account when determining
whether quality standards were met. The plaintis claimed that \government standard Congou" for purposes of the contract
meant Congou tea which government examiners allowed into the country. The defendants argued that \government standard
Congou" meant Congou tea equal to government standards in all aspects, including appearance and market value. The court
held that the contract term was ambiguous and that the question should be submitted to a jury. However, the complaint was
dismissed on other grounds.
31441 Stat. 712 (May 31, 1920), repealed by 110 Stat. 1198 (April 9, 1996).
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ered by importers. Id.
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31854 Stat. 1237, x 12 (1940 Reorganization Plan No. IV x 12) (eective June 30, 1940).
4041.319 In order to preserve the program, industry agreed to pay for enforcement through an inspection fee
of 3 1
2 cents for every hundred pounds of tea imported.320 In 1943, the compensation and expenses for
the Board of Tea Experts, formerly paid by the Secretary of the Treasury, was transferred to the FSA's
appropriation.321 The 1943 amendment also provided the 1897 Act with its ocial statutory title, the \Tea
Importation Act."322
In 1953, Congress created the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW),323 later to be renamed
Health and Human Services (HHS).324 All functions of the former Federal Security Agency (including FDA
and its Tea Act enforcement authority) were transferred to the new department.325
The 1990's push to repeal the Tea Act
Starting shortly after the Great Depression, those in favor of cutting the federal budget made occasional
murmurs about repealing the Tea Importation Act. In more recent years, Presidents Nixon, Carter and
Reagan were all in favor of ending the inspection program.326 None of these half-hearted attempts had much
319Killingsworth, supra note 65, at 502.
320Id.; see also 55 Stat. 478 (July 1, 1941), repealed by 110 Stat. 1198 (April 9, 1996).
32157 Stat. 499, 500 (July 12, 1943).
322Id. at 499.
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326See Tom Teepen, Bag the Federal Tea Board? The Case for the Tasters, The News and Observer, Raleigh, NC, Sept. 28,
1995, at A15; see also Carl Peel, Tea act is still intact, Tea and Coee Trade J. 48, Dec. 1, 1995; Martin Anderson, Teeing
o board of tenacious tea tasters Cutting waste: Tactics to stay alive leave a bad taste, The Detroit News, Sept. 19, 1993.
Anderson, a former White House sta member, tells an interesting story about the Nixon administration: in 1970, Nixon was
increasingly concerned with the rise in federal spending and wanted to \nd some program, any program, that deserved to
be eliminated and to do so simply to prove that it could be done." They chose the Tea Board to make an example of, and
it was simply crossed o the budget. The administration was pleased with itself until informed that the Board could not be
eliminated absent an act of Congress. A law to repeal the 1897 Act was drafted, sent to Congress, and was quashed by tea
industry lobbyists. Congress refused to pass the bill, with the justication that the savings would be too insignicant. Id.
41support, in large part because the savings to the budget were so small.
The 1990's saw several attacks on the tea program, most of which were unsuccessful. Politicians who wanted
to end the program did not entirely understand its workings. Simply cutting the program's budget wouldn't
end the program itself: As long as the Tea Importation Act was on the books, FDA had the obligation to
set tea standards and enforce them, regardless of whether Congress appropriated funds for the activity.327
Additionally, targeting any single part of the three-part scheme of standard setting, enforcement, and adju-
dication would accomplish little. In regards to this phenomenon, Senator Reid { the Tea Importation Act's
most vocal and tenacious opponent - stated, \These tea-tasting people are just like lizards. You grab them
and jerk something o and they are right back."328
In 1993, for example, some Congress members tried to kill the Act, but the legislature instead reached a
compromise with the industry: the Act would not be repealed if the tea trade was willing to pick up the tab.
First, the Board of Tea Experts would receive no federal funding for its activities, which totaled approxi-
mately $7,000 per year. 329 Industry would take responsibility for this expense. Second, the inspection fee
was raised from raised from 3 1
2 cents per hundredweight to 10 cents per hundredweight in order to cover all
enforcement costs.330 Through an oversight in the Harmonized Tari Schedule, this higher duty was never
enforced.331 If it had been, the government would have easily collected the $200,000 enforcement cost.332
It was in 1996 that the Tea Importation Act was nally repealed. Congress passed the Federal Tea Taster's
327Cindy Skyzycki, The Cup Board isn't Bare Yet; Apparently the FDA's Teatasters Will Get Federal Funding Again, The
Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1995, at F01; see also David Brotherton, Tea-tasters' survival angers Reid, The Las Vegas Review-
Journal, Dec. 19, 1995, at 9D (quoting FDA spokesman Don McLearn: \The law doesn't say we should not have a tea taster
at the FDA. It places restrictions on how our tea tasters can interact with the tea board and raises questions about how any
of these positions are supposed to be funded").
328Teepen, supra note 326.
329Skyzycki, supra note 327.
330107 Stat. 378 (August 10, 1993).
331H. Rep. No. 104-467(II) (1996).
332Id.
42Repeal Act,333 nally bringing the program to a close. This move was not supported by industry, which
lobbied against the repeal.334 However, the tenacity of a few legislators, including Senator Reid, overcame
the tea lobby. Parallel legislation was introduced in the House335 and the Senate.336 The House bill was
passed by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton.337
The House reports cited three major reasons for the repeal. First, Congress wished to reduce the cost
to taxpayers.338 Second, they stated that the Tea Act was redundant; the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act provided consumers with sucient protection.339 Finally, legislators felt that the tea trade was
over-regulated.340
Conclusion:
All a Matter of Principle?
333110 Stat. 1198 (April 9, 1996).
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strongly about. And its worth ghting for." Id. Simrany also states, \Having the Tea Importation Act is a signal to all the
growers of the world over that the U.S. is not the place to unload your adulterated tea. It assures quality and also provides a
rst line of defense for the industry." Id.
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43The repeal of the Tea Importation Act has not greatly aected the quality of teas on the American market.
Certainly, consumers are not subjected to the sorts of evils they faced in the late 19th century. So, to a
large extent, there is some truth to the assertion that the Tea Importation Act was made redundant by FDA
enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act.
However, the justications for passing the Act given by the House reports are somewhat suspect. Over-
regulation of the industry was cited as a central reason for ending the program, yet it is clear that industry
did not, and never did, favor repeal of the Tea Importation Act. American industry viewed the Act as a
rst line of defense for merchants, as well as an additional layer of computer protection. Indeed, industry
described the relationship between itself and the government as unusually congenial. Thus, any justication
that the repeal was good for industry should not be taken at face value.
Cost to taxpayers was ultimately a red herring as well. Industry had proved it was ready and willing to pay
the expenses of the program. Industry leaders already paid all expenses of the standard setting meetings of
the Board of Tea Experts. As in 1940 and 1993, the trade was content to pay increased inspection fees to
fully fund enforcement of the Board of Tea Expert's standards. Indeed, had the inspection fee increase of
1993 been properly enforced, the Tea Act's program would already have been self-funding, with no additional
fee increase necessary.
To use Senator Reid words, the repeal must have come down to a matter of principle341 - a rmly held belief
as to the proper role of government in American life. In this view, the federal government should not be in
the business of setting and upholding quality standards. Instead, competition could be trusted to uphold tea
341\This is a matter of principle with me. It didn't involve a lot of money, but it was a matter of principle." Reid wins round
in battle to kill controversial Board of Tea Experts, The Las Vegas Review-Journal, Feb. 2, 1996, at 3B.
44quality. Americans were capable of choosing what they wished to drink, and if consumers wished to sacrice
quality for price, it was their right to do so.
Behind this expressed libertarian view, other members of Congress may have had another hidden worry:
regulatory capture. While the Act did not directly delegate standard setting to the industry, traditionally,
six of the seven members of the Board of Tea Experts had been industry members.342 It may be that the
government was hard pressed to nd `experts in tea' who were not also in the business. Nevertheless, the
relationship described by industry leaders as \congenial" may have been more troubling to federal lawmakers
than it was to the tea trade.
It is also possible that the repeal was passed in large part due to a misunderstanding of the industry's
position on the matter - and a miscalculation of the actual cost to taxpayers. From the justications given
in the House reports, it is fairly clear that legislators did not understand (or chose to ignore) the actual state
of things. Some speculate that one factor in this was that Mr. Robert H. Dick,343 the nation's Chief Tea
Examiner and president of the Board of Tea Experts, was unable to lobby for the program due to his failing
health.344 With no knowledgeable voice to counter Reid's tenacious politics, Congress was left with the false
impression that the Tea Importation Act was useless - an anachronism.
Tracing the Tea Importation Act's history serves as a small lesson in the development (and subsequent
342See Killingsworth, supra note 65, at 500.
343Mr. Dick was highly respected by the industry. On article described him as \a dozen-sample-a-minute connoisseur who
could identify a brew right down to its exotic origin, sometimes its particular garden." Calvin Woodward, Tea and Milk: A
Brew for Budget Cutting and Political Gain, The Associated Press Political Service, April 10, 1996. The various articles written
on Mr. Dick disagree as to his age at the time of the repeal (and his retirement from government service). However, all place
him in his mid to late 70's as of 1996, and all state that his entire 50-odd year career with the government was spent tasting
tea. See e.g., Skyzycki, supra note 327; see also Sean Holton, Budget had tea tasters in hot water Clinton want to dump tasting
panel to save money, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 15, 1993.
344Teepen, supra note 326, commenting, \taking cruel advantage of an illness that has sidelined the redoubtable chemist Dick,
Congress is after the tea tasters in earnest."
45partial dismantling) of the administrative state. In the end, the story of the Act is most interesting not for
itself, but for the exposition it presents on changing political attitudes toward the role of government { and
its proper relationship to industry - over the last century.
46